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Comment
THE FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE: AN
ARGUMENT FOR CAUTIOUS REVISION
INTRODUCTION

The federal bribery statute1 serves as a powerful tool for
18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
Subsections (b) and (c) of the statute govern the giving and receiving of bribes:
(b) Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises
anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected to
be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person
who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any
other person or entity, with intent:
(1) to influence any official act; or
(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing, or
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(3) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, or
(c) Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public
official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits,
seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or
for any other person or entity, in return for:
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act; or
(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(3) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of his
official duty. ...
shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not
more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any
office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
Subsections (f) and (g) of the statute govern the giving and receiving of illegal
gratuities:
(f) Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected
to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be
performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected
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the prosecution of offenses violating the public trust.2 A
strong and broad bribery statute is necessary as both "an imto be a public official; or
(g) Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value
for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed
by him ....
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two
years, or both.
Although this comment is limited to a consideration of the federal bribery statute it should be noted that the states also have statutes proscribing certain payments
to public officials. See generally ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 13A-10-61 (Supp. 1979); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.56.100-.130 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-2601 to 2604 (Supp. 1978);
ARK.STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2701 to 2704 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 67-68, 70-70.5, 85-86,
92-94.5 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-302 to 305 (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-147 to 148 (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 1201-1206 (1979);
D.C. CODE §§ 22-701 to 702 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 838.015-.016 (West 1976); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-2301 to 2305 (1977); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 710-1041 (1976); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-1301 to 1303, -1307 to 1309, -1351 to 1352, -1354, -1356 to 1358 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 33-1 to 2 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-44-1-1 (Burns 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 722.1-.2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. § 213901 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 521.020 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:118 (West
1974 & Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 601-607 (Supp. 1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 23 (Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268A, §§ 2-3 (Michie/Law. Coop 1968); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.117-.118 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.42
(West 1964 & Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-11-11 to 13 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 576.010-.020 (Vernon 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-7-102, -104, -105
(1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-917 (Cum. Supp. 1978); S. 9, Nev. Leg., 60th Sess., ch.
655 §§ 2-5, 1979 Nev. Stats. 1417 (amending NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 197.010-.040 (1973));
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 640:1-:5 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c:27-2, -4, -6, -7
(West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-24-1 to 2 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
200.00-.50 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-217 to 218 (1969 & Supp. 1979);
N.D. CENr. CODE 12.1-12-01, -03 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.02 (Page 1975);
OKLA.STAT. tit. 21, §§ 381-382 (Supp. 1979); OR.REV. STAT. §§ 762.015-035 (1977); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4701 (Purdon 1973); R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 11-7-3 to 5 (1969);
S.C. CODE §§ 16-9-210 to 300 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-12A-4 to 11 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-801 to 823 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 36.02, .07.09 (Vernon 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-103, -105 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 1101-1102 (1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-447 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.68.010
(1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-5A-3, -4, -6 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.10 (West 1958 &
Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-8-201 (1977).
2 Offenses "violating the public trust" encompass both outright bribery'and "situations in which corruption can easily develop through favorites and the misuse of
discretionary authority on the part of the administrative officials, induced by such
activities on the part of the corrupter as campaign contributions, gifts and the like."
C. FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS 155 (1972).
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mediate deterrent to misbehavior and a long-term method' of
inculcating ethical standards."3 Since its enactment in 1962,1
the present statute5 has withstood numerous attacks upon its
constitutionality 6 and the scope of its application.7 While it is
clear that the statute is not a paradigm of clarity8 and is in
need of minor revision, it is equally apparent that any revised
statute must be as broad and as comprehensive as the existing
statute to effectuate the underlying congressional policies.
This comment will examine the federal bribery statute
with a view toward future legislative revision." The first section of the comment explores the policy underlying the bribery and gratuity provisions of the statute0 and the second
section examines the judicial interpretation of the meaning
and constitutionality of the statute."1 The final section exam' See Cranston, Regulating Conflict of Interest of Public Officials: A Comparative Analysis, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 215, 224 (1979).
' Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §
201 (1976)). Until October 23, 1962, most of the provisions similar to those comprising § 201 were codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1958). The first general bribery statute was enacted in 1853. Ch. 81, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1853).
6 In this comment, 18 U.S.C. § 201 will be referred to as the "statute" and the
"federal bribery statute."
6 See, e.g., United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); United
States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501 (1971)(former Congressman's indictment under the federal bribery statute does
not violate the speech or debate clause).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393
(3d Cir. 1958).
8 "[W]e do not cite [the federal bribery statute] as a model of clarity and nicely
drawn distinctions." United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9 Legislation presently is being drafted by the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice for the purpose of revising Title 18 of the United States Code; such revision
would include 18 U.S.C. § 201. SuBcoMMrrraE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HoUSE
JUDICIARY CoMmr'E, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., CRIMNAL CODE REviSION Acr OF 1980
(Comm. Print 1980). A prior bill, the Criminal Reform Bill of 1978, was passed by the
Senate but not acted upon by the full House. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REC. 5860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978), (passage by the Senate); 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REPORT 3014-15 (1978) (decision by House Judiciary Committee not to report the
bill).
10 See notes 15-30 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy
underlying the bribery and gratuity provisions of the statute.
12 See notes 31-110 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial
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ines the problems engendered by the application of the statute to members of Congress in light of protections afforded by
the speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution. 12 As the following discussion will indicate, revision of the
existing federal bribery statute should be approached with
caution. Despite some minor problems, the statute provides
sufficient notice of the type of conduct its prohibits, is susceptible to consistent judicial interpretation, and generally serves
its purpose well. Although it is possible to theorize about the
dangers inherent in the abusive application of the statute and
to conjure up "hypothetical problems which may yet arise in
the peripheral areas of the law's coverage,"' 3 one should be
careful to consider these imaginary scenarios in light of judicial interpretation of the statute, the practical limitation on
prosecutorial discretion and, perhaps above all else, common
sense.1 4 Any legislation designed to revise the statute should
be examined with considerable scrutiny to prevent the statute
from being narrowed into inadquacy.
I.

POLICY UNDERLYING THE FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE

It is a major concern of organized society that the community have the benefit of objective evaluation and unbaised
interpretation of the federal bribery statute.
12 See notes 111-126 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
the speech or debate clause on the applicability of the federal bribery statute to
members of Congress.
1" United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The words of Justice Holmes in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 216 (1914) are particularly relevant here. In discussing a claim that the antitrust
14

provisions of the constitution and statutes of Kentucky were void for indefiniteness
Justice Holmes stated that:
[A] criminal law is not unconstitutional merely because it throws upon men
the risk of rightly estimating a matter of degree . . . .That deals with the
actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts. It goes no
further than to recognize that, as with negligence, between the two extremes of the obviously illegal and the plainly lawful there is a gradual approach and that the complexity of life makes it impossible to draw a line in
advance without an artificial simplification that would be unjust. The conditions are as permanent as anything human, and a great body of precedents on the civil side coupled with familiar practice make it comparatively
easy for common sense to keep to what is safe.
Id. at 223.
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judgment on the part of those who participate in the making
of official decisions. Therefore, society deals sternly with
bribery which would substitute the will of an interested person for the judgment of a public official as the controlling
factor in official decision. 5

The purpose of the federal bribery statute is to put public
officials on notice that society demands complete honesty and
will prosecute any misuse of the public trust.16 Both the legislative history of the federal bribery statute and the case law
interpreting the statute reflect this strong public policy.
The legislative history, while not particularly enlightening
17
as to the interpretation of various provisions of the statute,
is nevertheless explicit regarding the underlying policy.18 On
April 27, 1961, President Kennedy, acting on the basis of the
report of his specially appointed Advisory Panel on Ethics
and Conflict of Interest in Government, sent a strong message
to Congress calling for a revision of the laws governing conflicts of interest among public officials and submitting proposed legislation toward that end.19 The President's message
was clear: effective government and public confidence demand
absolute impartiality on the part of public officials. 20 Congress
1" United

States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393, 394 (3rd Cir. 1958).
See generally Winckler, Drafting an Effective Bribery Statute, 1 AM. J. CrIM.
L. 210 (1972).
17 United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
967 (1966).
18 See generally Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. § 306 (Supp. 1965), reprinted
in 18 U.S.C.A. § 201, at 274 (1972); 1 PUB. PAPERS 326 (1961) (President John F.
Kennedy), reprintedin 107 CONG. REC. 6835 (1961); S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3852.
19 Immediately upon assuming office, President Kennedy appointed this special
three-man Advisory Panel, consisting of retired Judge Calvert Magruder of the
United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit, Dean Jefferson B. Fordham of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor Bayless Manning of the Yale
Law School. The Panel submitted its report in March of 1961. On the basis of this
report, the recommendations of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
the work of Subcommittee Number Five of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
the President's message, and other sources, Congress drafted and enacted 18 U.S.C. §
201. For an excellent work detailing the report of the Advisory Panel and providing
background to the statute, see B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREsT LAW
(1964).
20 1 Pus. PAPERS 326 (1961)(President John F. Kennedy), reprintedin 107 CONG.
REC. 6835 (1961). The opening paragraph of the President's message is indicative of
19

1979-80]

FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE

1031

responded to the President's concern21 and consolidated the
"scraps and rag tags" making up federal bribery law22 into the

revised federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. section 201. The
stated objective of the legislation was to bring uniformity into
the general tone of the report:
No responsibility of government is more fundamental than the responsibility of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior by those who
conduct the public business. There can be no dissent from the principle
that all officials must act with unwaivering integrity, absolute impartiality
and complete devotion to the public interest. This principle must be followed not only in reality but in appearance. For the basis of effective government is public confidence, and that confidence is endangered when ethical standards falter or appear to falter.
Id.
21 It should be mentioned that the President's message did not include an explicit request for a revision of the then-existing bribery laws, and although his proposed bill did contain a section entitled "Compensation From Private Sources," 107
CONG. REC. 6835, 6839 (1961), the bill did not use the word "bribery."
However, it is possible that Congress took its cue from some language in the
President's message. Commenting on the scope of his proposed bill, the President
stated that:
[T]he bill deals only with employees involved in executive, administrative
and regulatory functions. It does not apply to either the judicial or legislative branch of Government. Existing laws relating to the judiciary are
deemed adequate. The adequacy and effectiveness of laws regulating the
conduct of Members of Congress and congressional employees should be
left to strictly congressional determination.
107 CONG. REc. at 6837 (emphasis added). The President also expressed concern over
influence-buying payments and indicated that he intended to deal with that problem
"directly by Presidential order, memorandum, or other form of action." Id. The President indicated that he intended to:
Prohibit gifts to Goverment personnel whenever (a) the employee has reason to believe that the gift would not have been made except for his official
position; or (b) whenever a regular Government employee has reason to believe that the donor's private interests are likely to be affected by actions of
the employee or his agency. When it is impossible or inappropriate to refuse the gift it will be turned over to an appropriate public or charitable
institution.
Such an order will embody the general principle that any gift which is,
or appears to be, designed to influence official conduct is objectionable.
Government employees are constantly bothered by offers of favors or gratuities and have been without any general regulation to guide their conduct.
This order will attempt to supply such guidelines, while leaving special
problems, including problems created by gifts from foreign governments, to
agency regulation.
Id. at 6837-38.
22 AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND

FEDERAL SERVICE 19 n.12 (1960).
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the law and, more particularly, not to "restrict the broad
scope of the [prior] bribery statutes as construed by the
courts."2

3

This broad interpretation, expounded by Congress and
undoubtedly necessary to the continued effectiveness of the
statute, has been afforded repeated judicial approval.24 In

light of this policy, for example, courts have consistently held
that any public official accepting a bribe with the requisite
corrupt intent is guilty of bribery,25 even though the object of
the bribe cannot be obtained.26 Similarly, under the gratuity
subsection of the statute, 7 the awarding of gifts to a public
official related to his official acts has been deemed to be an
evil in itself even though the donor does not have corrupt intent, because such an act tends either subtly, or otherwise, to
cloud the official's judgment.2 8 By evincing concern about the
need for a comprehensive bribery statute, the courts have rec23 S.REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3852, 3853. After stating the purpose of the revision, the Report elaborated on the underlying reasoning for the amendment:
The necessity for maintaining high ethical standards of behavior in the
Government becomes greater as its activities become more complex and
bring it into closer and closer contact with the private sector of the Nation's
economy. The best means of assuring high standards have been a matter of
increasing concern in recent years, as evidenced by the work of various
committees of the Congress, the executive branch, members of the bar, and
others. All of these groups have found that the present laws, while correct
in principle, are confusing and inadequate and to a considerable degree are
actually a hindrance to the Government. This committee has come to the
same conclusion.
Id.

I 4 See, e.g., United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1069 (1978); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); Parks v. United States, 355 F.2d 167, 168-69 (5th Cir.
1965); Wilson v. United States, 230 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931
(1956).
23 See note 1 supra for the text of the bribery provisions of the federal bribery
statute.
2' See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971); Kemler v. United States, 133 F.2d 235, 238 (1st Cir. 1942).
, See note 1 supra for the text of the gratuity subsections of the statute.
2 United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
967 (1966). See also ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note
22, at 17. "[Wlhere public confidence is at issue, what people think is true may be as
important as what is true." Id.
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ognized that the statute represents a congressional effort to
eliminate the temptation inherent in public office.29 Indeed,
Congress in enacting the federal bribery statute, and the
courts in construing it, have emphasized that only a broadly
construed, all-inclusive statute will be sufficient to maintain
the high ethical standards of behavior in government.30
I.

JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATION OF

18 U.S.C.

SECTION

201:

CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS?

Although both Congress and the courts have acknowledged the indispensability of a sufficiently broad bribery statute, those indicted under the law have attacked it on the
grounds that it is unconstitutionally vagues ' and overbroad. 2
While this is understandable in view of the necessarily expansive nature of the statute, close scrutiny makes it apparent
that the statute can survive these challenges. Indeed, the
"language of the statute clearly and adequately expresses its
purposes, '33 and the courts have been consistent in rejecting
claims of vagueness and overbreadth. The uniformity of judicial interpretation reinforces the argument that the statute is
explicit enough to avoid constitutional infirmity. The statute
2, See United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870

(1978).
30

See generally 107 CONG. REc. 14774, 14779 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay);

supra note 22; Petrowitz, Conflict of Interest in FederalProcurement, 29 LAW COhrEMP. PROB. 196 (1964); Note,
Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47 VA. L. REV. 1034 (1961).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); United
States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965). For a general discussion of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
83-89 (1972); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). For a good discussion of the application of the vagueness doctrine to statutes governing public ethics see Comment, Texas Public Ethics Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 TEx. L. REv. 931, 978-81 (1972).
32See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Passman, 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978). For a general discussion of the
overbreadth doctrine see J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722-26 (1978); Note, The First Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83
HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
33 United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
948 (1976)(citing United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966)).
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
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is not without its problems, but inasmuch as these problems
do not reach constitutional dimensions, any statutory revision
should be approached with caution lest the statute be
divested of its effectiveness.
A.

Vagueness

Since its enactment, the federal bribery statute has
weathered challenges that it is unconstitutionally vague.3 4 In
United States v. Brewster, 5 for example, the defendant, a
former United States Senator, challenged his conviction under
subsection 201(g)38 on several grounds, one being that the
subsection was unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned
that the subsection's standards were sufficiently explicit to
prevent any danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application.3 7 A similar situation was presented and a similar conclusion reached in United States v. Irwin.3 8 In dismissing a
vagueness challenge to subsection 201(f),'9 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated: "It is apparent from the language of
the subsection . . . what Congress had in mind .... The
statute furnished adequate warning to anyone of ordinary intelligence that the kind of conduct embarked upon by the ap11 See cases cited in note 31 supra; see also United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d
1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Passman, 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'e See note 1 supra for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1976).
17 506 F.2d at 77. The Second Circuit observed:
[T]he language of section 201(g). . . "give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly." The section's standards are sufficiently explicit to prevent
delegation of "basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application." Hence, section 201(g) is not impermissibly vague even under the standards applied to statutes governing
the conduct of average citizens. That 201(g) is directed at the conduct of
public officials, who should exercise extraordinary caution to avoid acts
potentiallyviolative of their public trust, makes us even more reluctant to
accept the argument that the section is vague.
Id. (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)) (emphasis added and
footnotes omitted).
" 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
"
See note 1 supra for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1976).
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pellant would constitute an offense."4 e
As the foregoing decisions indicate, the courts are in accord that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, at least
not as applied to the specific individuals before the court in a
given case., 1 The question remains, however, and must be examined in light of the possibility of future legislative revision,
whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague in its general
scope. The major concerns underlying the vagueness issue are:
(1) the type of criminal intent necessary for a conviction
under each of the subsections of the statute; 42 (2) whether the
gratuity subsections are lesser included offenses of the corresponding bribery subsections;43 and (3) the time element in
the bribery section, particularly whether the bribe must precede the action or decision of the public officer. 4 An inherent
consideration in the analysis of whether the existing bribery
statute is unconstitutionally vague is the extent to which the
statute is susceptible to uniform judicial interpretation. The
following discussion will indicate that while the courts have
treated the intent issue with uniformity, some inconsistencies
in interpretation have surfaced in the judicial reaction to the
latter two issues. These inconsistencies, however, do not
render the statute unconstitutionally vague, and minor revision should be sufficient to clarify those aspects of the statute.
1.

The Intent Issue: Sufficient Notice
as to Prohibited Conduct?

The decisional law indicates that the major dispute surrounding 18 U.S.C. section 201 involves the mental state re40 354 F.2d at 196.
41 Courts are limited in their perusal of a statute on vagueness grounds to the
facts of the case before them. They rely on "the principle that a person to whom a
statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
4" See notes 45-91 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the intent
issue.
13 See notes 92-97 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the lesser
included offense issue.
" See notes 98-104 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the time
element issue.
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quired for a conviction under each of the subsections of the
statute.4 The dispute, however, actually centers between
those indicted under the statute and the courts, rather than
among the courts themselves. The cases as a whole reflect a
consistent interpretation of the intent requirements of the
statute. This uniformity in judicial approach stands in direct
contrast to the confusion evidenced by those indicted under
the statute, who have confused the intent required for a bribery conviction with that required for a gratuity conviction.46
Bribery and gratuities are dealt with in separate subsections of the statute. 47 The bribery subsection makes it a crime

when one "corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any public official... with intent to influence any
act.'

48

The corresponding gratuity subsection of the statute

provides: "Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives,
offers or promises anything of value to any public official...
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed
by such public official . . . [is guilty of a violation]." 49 Each

section prescribes different penalties, with the penalty for violation of a bribery subsection being considerably harsher. 0
The bribery subsections of the statute specifically require a
"corrupt" state of mind while the gratuity subsections require
only that the gratuity be given "otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty.

. .

for or because

of any official act." The statute clearly embodies two distinct
offenses. 51
"I See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 870 (1978); United States v. Polansky, 418 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1969); United States

v. Fenster, 449 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
4 See United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1978), and the cases

cited therein.
47 See note 1 supra for the text of the relevant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 201.
48

18 U.S.C. § 201(b). Section 201(c) is the related section directed at the public

official who accepts a bribe.
4" 18 U.S.C. § 201(0 (1976). Section 201(g) is the related section directed at the
public official who accepts a gratuity.

50 See note 1 supra for the penalties for violation of the respective provisions.
51 In United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the bribery and gratuity provisions of the statute could be
distinguished on the basis of the degree of criminal intent necessary for a conviction:
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a. Intent Under the Bribery Subsections
The bribery subsections of the statute require proof of a
specific corrupt intent to influence public action.5 2 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed in United States v. Irwin,53 Congress "made a distinction between the two groups
of subsections and purposely omitted from the latter [gratuity] group the description of the specific intent which was an
essential element of the former. ' 54 In United States v.
Congress did not use the same language in defining criminal intent for
the two offenses. "Corruptly" bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowledge and purpose than does "otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty." It appears entirely possible that a public
official could accept a thing of value "otherwise than as provided by law for
the proper discharge of official duty," and at the same time not do it "corruptly." Congress obviously wished to prohibit public officials accepting
things of value with either degree of criminal intent; it did so, but it legislated a difference in the requisite criminal intent and correspondingly in
the penalties attached.
Id. at 71.
52 "[T]he federal judiciary has characterized the first group of offenses requiring
a corrupt intent as bribery, and has referred to the lesser included offense, not requiring a corrupt intent, as the giving or receiving of an illegal gratuity." United States v.
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d
471 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 80 (1967).
53 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
51 Id. at 197. Although the language used by the Second Circuit in Irwin tends to
suggest that Congress made a conscious decision to include the word "corruptly" as
descriptive of the specific intent necessary for a conviction under the bribery provisions of the statute, the legislative history indicates that there is some uncertainty as
to how the word found its way into the statute. As indicated earlier in notes 17-23
supra and accompanying text, the bill that eventually became 18 U.S.C. § 201, H.R.
8140, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), was the product of a growing concern about federal
conflict of interest. The legislative history prior to the enactment of H.R. 8140 is
illustrative. Pursuant to its objective of strengthening federal criminal laws relating
to conflicts of interest, Congress considered at least four bills: H.R. 139, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 3411, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 3412, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); and H.R. 3050, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). H.R. 139 was the Kennedy
administration's bill, and H.R. 3050 was proposed by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York by Representative John Lindsay. H.R. 3411 and H.R. 3412 were
identical bills and will be referred to in this discussion as H.R. 3411. H.R. 3411 was
the only proposal that directly addressed the bribery issue; it contained a revision of
the existing bribery statutes. However, H.R. 3411 did not include the word "corruptly." Exactly how the term "corruptly" came to be included in the final compromise bill, H.R. 8140, is unclear, but some clues do exist. Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General, testified in the hearings before the House
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Strand5 5 the Ninth Circuit described the intent element necessary for a conviction under the bribery subsection 201(c) as,
"the defendant's knowing acceptance of money for financial
gain, in return for violation of his official duty, with the specific intent to violate the law."5' In reference to the same sub-7
section, the Second Circuit in United States v. Polansky
subcommittee that was responsible for recommendations concerning the proposed
legislation. See generally Federal Conflict of Interest Legislation: Hearings on H.R.
302, H.R. 3050, H.R. 3411, H.R. 3412, and H.R. 7139 Before the Antitrust Subcomm.

of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].As part of his testimony, Katzenbach placed several prepared documents in the record, including an analysis of H.R. 3411; only one section of that

analysis is relevant to this topic. That section included the following statement:
The danger that innocent conduct may fall within the provisions of the pro-

posed sections 201 and 202 may be avoided by the inclusion of a term such
as "willfully" or "corruptly" in subsection (b) (p.3, line 18). "Corruptly" is

employed in title 18, United States Code section 1503 and has never
presented any serious obstacle to conviction.
Id. at 36. It is likely that this suggestion carried a great deal of weight in the formulation of the section of H.R. 8140 that was to become 18 U.S.C. § 201. It should be
noted, however, that Katzenbach made his suggestion in reference to H.R. 3411, not
H.R. 8140. In fact, it is possible to argue that the inclusion of the word "corruptly" in
H.R. 8140 was contrary to Congress' intention to consolidate but not to limit the
existing law. Indeed, in its report on H.R. 8140, the House Judiciary Committe
stated:
This section substitutes for the principal sections dealing with bribery
now contained in sections 201 to 213 of chapter 11 of title 18, one comprehensive statute applicable to all persons performing activities for or on behalf of the United States. Varying terminology is used in the different statutes presently in force. Although in many instances the courts have
construed these differing terms as having the same meaning, uniformity will
be assured by enacting one statute using the same terms for all bribery
situations. The bill does not limit in any way the broad interpretationthat
the courts have given to the bribery statutes;rather,the intent is to insure
that this broad interpretationshall be given universal application.
H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1961)(emphasis added). It is clear from
the last sentence of the Judicary Committee's report that Congress was satisfied with
the breadth of the existing bribery statute; the inclusion of the word "corruptly" restricted the breadth that Congress was trying to preserve. This analysis of legislative
history suggests that the word "corruptly" was included in one piece of legislation H.R. 8140 - where it was neither needed nor wanted, when, in fact, it had been
suggested for inclusion in a different bill - H.R. 3411. Any language in the case law
suggesting that Congress made a conscious decision to include the word "corruptly"
in the existing bribery statute should be considered in light of this legislative history.
55 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 996 (emphasis in original).
57 418 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1969).
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stated that the intent required "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused had corruptly agreed to receive the
money with the specific intent that, in return therefore, it
would influence his performance of an official act."'5 8 While
the courts have utilized different language, their interpretations of the intent necessary for a conviction under the bribery subsections are consistent in substance. The case law indicates that the bribery subsection "prohibits the giving of a
thing of value with the specific intent of influencing an official
action." 59
Some courts, in addition to the requirement of specific
criminal intent, or as a substitution therefor, require proof of
a quid pro quo for a bribery conviction. 0 Some courts do not
speak to the intent element per se but instead describe a specific quid pro quo as the distinguishing factor between bribery
and illegal gratuities."1 Other courts use the two terms interchangeably throughout their opinions, 2 while courts in a
fourth group base their decisions solely on the "intent element" without discussing a quid pro quo. 3 Although these
courts might appear to be expounding discordant interpretations, their approaches are in fact harmonious. A "corrupt aco Id. at 446.
Perry, The Fuzzy World of Illegal Gratuities,DISTRiar LAw. 25, 26 (June/July
1979).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Dobson, 609 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Neiderberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d
1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d

62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See United States v. Neiderberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68 (3rd Cir. 1978).

ee United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976).
Not every gift, favor, or contribution to a government or political official
constitutes bribery. It is universally recognized that bribery occurs only if
the gift is coupled with a particular criminal intent ...... "Bribery" imports the notion of some more or less specific quid pro quo for which the
2

gift or contribution is offered or accepted.
Id. at 734.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); United

States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Polansky, 418 F.2d 444
(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Cohen, 387 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390

U.S. 996 (1968); United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 80 (1967); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,

383 U.S. 967 (1966); United States v. Labovitz, 251 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1958).
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ceptance in return for being influenced" evidences a specific
criminal intent and a quid pro quo. As explained in one Senate Committee Report,6 4 a corrupt intent to influence implies
an offer or agreement contemplating the violation of the public official's duty. 5 Therefore, while the nomenclature varies,
the basic interpretation is consistent.
b.

Intent Under the Gratuity Subsections

In examining the judicial interpretations of the type of
mental state necessary to maintain a conviction under the gratuity subsections of the federal bribery statute, it is necessary
to employ a two-pronged analysis. A discussion of the language used by the courts in paraphrasing the degree of intent
required by the gratuity subsections will reveal that the courts
are consistent in their general description of that intent.6
Similarly, consideration of the courts' application of the intent requirement will illustrate that while it is at least arguable that the intent issue is susceptible to divergent treatment,
the judicial interpretation has been uniform. 7
It is well-settled that the gratuity subsections require a
significantly lesser degree of intent.6 8 To prevail, the govern6, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT

OF 1977, S.

REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1977). The Report accompanied the 1977
proposed Senate bill S. 1437.
"' [T]he gravamen of the bribery offense under current law is that a thing of
value is given or offered "corruptly" with the intent to influence or induce
the prohibited action .... It implies an offer or agreement contemplating
the violation of the public servant's duty. However, it also serves to denote
the state of mind of either the bribe offeror or the recipient, or both, and is
thus a word designating the culpability.
Id. See also United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Arthur, 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); United States v. Fenster, 449 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Mich. 1978); United
States v. Standefer, 452 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Passman,
460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978). But see 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, WORKING PAPERS 692 (1970).
6 See notes 68-76 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the language
employed by the courts in describing the type of intent necessary for a conviction
under the illegal gratuity provisions of the statute.
61 See notes 77-91 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the" court's
application of the intent requirement.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969); United
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ment must prove that the prohibited act was committed
"knowingly and purposefully and not through accident, misunderstanding, inadvertance or other innocent reasons."6 In
United States v. Raborn ° the Ninth Circuit stated that the
gratuity offenses "require proof of a knowing intent to violate
the law."7 1 Similarly, the court in United States v. Passman2
noted that the required intent for a conviction under subsection 201(g) does not require a specific intent: "[It] does, however, require a mens rea. It is necessary that the Government
prove that the defendant committed the act prohibited knowingly and not through accident or mistake.

7

-

When these ju-

dicial pronouncements are read in light of the statutory language requiring the giving or receiving of "anything of value
to any public official... for or because of any official act performed or to be performed,"'

4

it is clear that while the gratu-

ity subsections of the statute "do not require specific criminal
intent or a corrupt purpose,

'7 5

they "do require some prova-

ble relationship
between the giving of a gratuity and official
6
7

action.1

The application of this rather general formulation of the
intent necessary for a conviction is a considerably more difficult task. As one commentator has suggested, the issue inherent in any such application is whether this language requires
that "a payment be given because of some specific act of an
official in order to constitute an offense,

'7 7

or whether "the

States v. Cohen, 387 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968); United
States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
" United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
967 (1966).
70 575 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978).
71Id. at 691.
72 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
71 Id. at 915. As the court stated in United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1974): "However ill-defined it may be in the exact words of the statute, there is
and must be a general criminal intent on the part of the defendant to support a
conviction under the gratuity section (g)." Id. at 82.
7 See note 1 supra for the complete text of the gratuity subsections of the
statute.
75 Perry, supra note 59, at 26.
76 Id.

77 Id. at 27 (emphasis added). Perry refers to this as the "restrictive" interpretation of the gratuity subsections.
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payment only need to be related to an official's actions in
' '7

general.

Although it is at least arguable that this distinction between intent to influence a specific act and intent to "generally influence" could be a source for discord among the courts,
the existing case law indicates that the courts are consistent
in their consideration of the issue. 9 In United States v.
" Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Perry refers to this as the "expansive" interpretation of the gratuity subsections. It must be emphasized that inasmuch as this is the
broader approach it also necessarily would include payments given because of some
specific act. Under this interpretation, both payments made because of some specific
act and payments only intended to "generally influence," or so-called "goodwill gratuities," would be punishable under the gratuity subsections.
7' See United States v. Niederberger,580 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States
v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978); United States v.
Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v.
Standefer, 452 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
But see Perry, The Fuzzy World of Illegal Gratuities, DISTRICr LAWYER 25
(June/July 1979). As the title of Mr. Perry's article suggests, he argues that "the authorities are in serious conflict" over the issue of whether payments intended only to
"generally influence" an official's actions are prohibited by the gratuity provisions of
the statute. Id. at 26. He proposes that while Niederberger, Evans, Alessio and
Standefer are examples of the "expansive" position (see note 78 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "expansive" position), other courts have opted for
the "restrictive" approach (see note 77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"restrictive" approach). Perry contends that United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1974) is "the leading case on the restrictive side of the question." Id. at 27.
Indeed in Brewster, the court, discussing the criminal intent necessary for a conviction under the gratuity subsections, said that there "must be more specific knowledge
of a definite official act for which the contributor intends to compensate before an
official's action crosses the line between guilt and innocence." 506 F.2d at 81. However, one should be careful not to read too much into the Brewster opinion; indeed, it
is imperative to consider the court's language in light of the issue actually before it.
In Brewster, the court did not consider the question of whether a payment intended
only to "generally influence" - "a goodwill gratuity" - fell within the proscriptions
of the gratuity provisions of the statute. Rather, the court was confronted with the
legality of a payment made to an elected official for a specific act. Thus, the court did
not have to distinguish between "goodwill gratuities" and payments for a specific act;
instead the court was called upon "only to distinguish between accepting illegal gratuities under section 201(g) and receiving legal campaign contributions." 506 F.2d at
64. It is submitted here that, in its effort to distinguish between illegal gratuities and
legal campaign contributions, the court overstated the elements necessary for a conviction under the gratuity provisions of the statute. In fact, the Justice Department
has made this argument in attempting to explain the language in Brewster.
Federal prosecutors, however, generally argue that Brewster should not
be so interpreted because the court intended merely to distinguish between
legitimate political contributions and payments to an elected official that
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Niederberger0 the defendant, an employee of the Internal
Revenue Service, challenged his conviction under the gratuity
subsection of the statute claiming that it was necessary for the
government to allege that he received the gratuities8 1 "in return for some specific, identifiable act which he performed or
was to perform in the future. 8' 2 The Third Circuit rejected
this argument by holding that:
A quid pro quo is simply foreign to the elements of a subsection (g) offense. What is proscribed, simply put, is a public
official's receipt of a gratuity, to which he was not legally
entitled, given to him in the course of his everyday duties,
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, and he was in a position to
use his authority in a manner which could affect the gift83

giver.

would be unlawful.... They argue that this case is inapposite to payments
made to a non-elected official who should not be receiving any payments
relating to his official duties other than his salary.
Perry, supra, at 27. In light of the consistency evinced by the Niederberger,Evans,
Alessio and Standefer cases - all decisions since Brewster - it is reasonable to suggest that the language employed by the court in Brewster resulted more from an
effort to distinguish illegal gratuties and legal campaign contributions than from an
effort to define the scope of illegal gratuities. It must be emphasized that the Brewster court did not hold that payments made to "generally influence" were excluded
from the range of conduct prohibited by the gratuity provisions of the statute; in fact,
the court never even considered the issue.
80 580 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir. 1978).
" Gulf Oil Corporation provided the defendant with five all-expense paid golfing
trips, including trips to Pompano Beach Florida, Absecon, New Jersey, and Pebble
Beach, California. Id. at 65 n.1.
82 Id. at 68.
s3Id. at 69. In United States v. Standefer, 452 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1978),
the court relied on Niederberger to find the defendant guilty of violating a gratuity
subsection even though the payment was not made for a specific act. Id. at 1182-84. It
should be noted that Niederbergerand Standefer emanated from the same transaction. F.W. Standefer, as the corporate officer of Gulf Oil Corporation, extended gratuities to Cyril J. Niederberger, "a supervisory internal revenue agent who was case
manager for the audit of the Gulf Oil Corporation income tax returns for the years
1959 to 1964 .

. . ."

Id. at 1179. U.S. v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir. 1978),

involved the prosecution of Niederberger under section 201(g) for receiving illegal
gratuities. The Standefer case involved the prosecution of Standefer under section
201(0 for giving the illegal gratuities. Both defendants claimed that the gratuities
were not violative of the act as they were not made in return for a specific act done
by Niederberger, but rather just "to create a better working atmosphere by providing
these expensive junkets for the case supervisor .

.

. " 452 F. Supp. at 1183. The
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In United States v. Evans,84 the Fifth Circuit rebuffed a similar claim8 5 by holding that a conviction under the gratuity

subsection does not require "that the official actually engage
in identifiable conduct or misconduct nor that any specific
quid pro quo be contemplated by the parties nor even that
the official actually be capable of providing some official act as
quid pro quo at the time."8
The interpretation espoused by the Niederbergerand Evans courts portends a very broad reading of the gratuity subsection of the statute. An expansive interpretation of the gratuity provisions, however, is consistent with both the
congressional objective underlying the federal bribery statute 7 and the judicial belief that a broad reading is necessary
in order to effectuate the purposes of the statute." Admittedly, the statute's failure to delineate the elements of an iegal gratuity with exact precision, and the courts' tendency to
read the gratuity provisions broadly could, if carried to the
extreme, render the statute unconstitutionally vague. But, in
light of the possibility that greater specificity could create
loopholes and subvert the basic purpose underlying the statute, 9 and because the statute "is directed at the conduct of
courts rejected this argument by holding that the "creation of a better working atmosphere by giving of expensive presents and trips to an Internal Revenue Agent is
exactly what was proscribed by Congress in enacting these statutes." Id.
572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
Id. at 479.
"Id.
87 See notes 15-30 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy
underlying the federal bribery statute.
" See, e.g., United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 967 (1966).
The awarding of gifts thus related to an employee's official acts is an evil in
itself ....
The preference may concern nothing more than fixing the time
for a hearing or giving unusually prompt consideration to the application of
a donor while earlier applications of non-donors are made to wait, even
though there is no evidence that the donor sought the particular preference ....
The iniquity of the procuring of public officials, be it intentional
or unintentional, is so fatally destructive to good government that a statute
designed to remove the temptation ... is a reasonable and proper
means.

...

Id. at 197.
89 For example, the proposed House bill has tempered the wording "anything of
value" to read "anything of pecuniary value" (emphasis added). "Pecuniary value"
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public officials who should exercise extraordinary caution to
avoid acts potentially violative of their public trust,"9 0 it is
both undesirable and unnecessary to revise the gratuity subsections of the statute with an eye toward greater specificity.
If the statute is to realize the congressional objective of promoting the integrity, fairness and impartiality of public officials, it is imperative that the language of the gratuity subsections remain sufficiently expansive. 1
2.

The Lesser Included Offense Issue

The great majority of courts unequivocally have held that
the gratuity subsections are lesser included offenses of the
corresponding bribery subsections. 2 In the recent case of
United States v. Passman,s a federal district court examined
this majority position in depth and reached a different conclusion. The court held that the subsection 201(g) gratuity count
is not necessarily a lesser included offense of the corresponding bribery count, subsection 201(c)(1). The court based this
is defined as "anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a
commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic
advantage; or any other property or service that has a value in excess of $100;. .. ."
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 96TH

CONG., 2D SESS., CRIMINAL CODE REviSION ACT OF 1980, 64, 68 (Comm. Print 1980).
Under this specific wording a $75 bottle of wine, a "night on the town," or weekend

use of the donor's beach condominium would not constitute a violation under the
statute. If gifts even tending to influence are to be discouraged, all-encompassing language is required.
" United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Although it is entirely possible to construct imaginary examples of abusive

application of the gratuity subsections of the statute, these fears should be allayed by
the fact that the Justice Department likely will not consider it worth its time and
energy to prosecute de minimis violations:
At the present time the government prosecutes goodwill gratuity cases only
in situations that involve costly gifts and entertainment. . . . In the real
world of private industry-government relations there is a general awareness
that an official's integrity is not compromised by the purchase of a lunch,
but the same may or may not hold true of an all-expense-paid vacation to
the Caribbean.
Perry, supra note 59, at 30.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Raborn, 575 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Masiello, 445
F.2d 1324, 1325 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1060 (1972); United States v.
Polansky, 418 F.2d 444, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1969).
11 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
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decision on an examination of the two sections and its determination "that there are some situations where proof of (c)
(1) would not support a conviction under (g)." 9 4 Specifically,

the court pointed to the requirement in subsection (g) that
the official must receive value for himself, as opposed to subsection (c) (1) under which a violation occurs if the official
receives value "for himself or for any other person or entity."' 5 The court reasoned that a conviction under subsection
(c)(1) where the public official received "anything of value"
for someone else would not support a conviction under subsection (g), therefore, violation of subsection (g) was not necessarily a lesser included offense of subsection (c) (1).96 Although situations could arise in which the lesser included
offense issue could precipitate a problem,9

7

it is clear that a

solid majority of the courts have been consistent in holding
that the gratuity provisions are lesser included offenses of the
corresponding bribery subsections. Inasmuch as this issue has
not resulted in a major interpretive conflict, statutory revision
to clarify the issue is really unnecessary.
" Id. at 917.
95 See note 1 supra for the complete text of the statute.
" 460 F. Supp. at 917-18. The same issue was presented in Brewster, but the
circuit court, refusing to "theorize," held that on the facts of that case the gratuity
count was a lesser included offense of the bribery count. 506 F.2d at 69. In dictum the
court stated:
It is always true that the greater offense contains an element which the
lesser included offense does not; this is one of the reasons for the use of the
terms "greater" and "lesser" to describe the two offenses, and why the
lesser is thought to be included in the greater.
Id. at 75.
" FED. R. CraM. P. 31(c) permits an instruction to the jury and conviction on a
lesser included offense, even though not specifically charged in the indictment. The
defense of a congressman indicted for taking a bribe in the form of a campaign contribution could differ radically depending on whether he was being charged solely
under the bribery section, or whether he was also on notice of the gratuity offense.
Proof that a lawful re-election committee had received the funds would be essential
to his defense under the gratuity section which requires that value be given to the
official himself, but would be irrelevant evidence as a defense to a charge under the
bribery section. Depending on the jurisdiction, the congressman could be considered
to be on notice that he must defend against a gratuity charge without it being
charged specifically in the indictment, despite the fact that it has not been uniformly
held to be a lesser included offense. Cf. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 75
(D.C. Cir. 1974)(the court recognized that this could possibly be a problem but did
not address it further as it was not a problem under the facts of that case).
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The Time Element Issue

A fundamental question arising out of application of the
bribery provision of the federal bribery statute is whether the
bribe must precede the action or decision of the public officer.
In both United States v. Passmans8 and United States v. Cohen,9 9 the courts took the position that the statute required
that the bribe precede the public official's action. In Cohen
the court noted that "[f]rom a time standpoint alone bribery
requires that money be given or promised with the intent to
influence an official's decision before that decision is
reached."100
In United States v. Arroyo101 the Seventh Circuit propounded an interpretation directly contrary to the position
adopted by the Passman and Cohen courts. In Arroyo the
court affirmed the defendant's conviction under the statute
and held that the statute is not limited in every case to bribery solicitations occurring before actual performance of an official act. The court studied both the face of the statute and
its legislative history and concluded that "[since] Congress
used broad language in these provisions we find no intent to
limit their coverage to future acts."10'2
While the inconsistency revealed by these three decisions
is not significant enough to render the statute unconstitutionally vague, minor statutory revision could rectify the conflict.
The statute should be reworded to make it clear that bribery
can encompass prior acts as well as acts to be performed in
the future. As the Seventh Circuit indicated in Arroyo, this
conclusion is mandated by the congressional purpose reflected
by the statutory definition of "official act" as "any. . . action
. . . which may at any time be pending.., before any public

official, in his official capacity."" 3 "The broad language of the
statute, and the purpose it was designed to accomplish, pres8

460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
387 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).

100Id. at 805-06.

201 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1978).
102

Id. at 654.

103

18 U.S.C. 201(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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B. Overbreadth
In addition to claims that the federal bribery statute is
unconstitutionally vague, some commentators 0 5 and several
of those indicted under the law have argued that the statute is
overbroad. The courts that have considered this issue have
been consistent in holding that the statute is constitutionally
acceptable.10 6 The primary contention of those challenging the
breadth of the statute is that the law could be construed to
outlaw legitimate campaign contributions "which arguably
can be characterized as the sort of political, associational activity protected by the First Amendment."' 07 In rejecting this
argument, the courts 0 8 have relied on the unequivocal language of the statute. Inasmuch as the bribery provisions require that the act be done corruptly, those making innocent
campaign contributions are not made susceptible to criminal
liability by virtue of making such payments; the necessary
specific intent is conspicuously absent in such cases. The gratuity subsections of the statute require that a payment be
made to the official himself and be knowingly and purposefully received by the official in consideration of an official
act.10 9 In light of these requirements it is unlikely that inno1"4581 F.2d at 655. In Arroyo, the Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows:
Congress having used broad language in these provisions, we find no intent
to limit their coverage to future acts. Congress did not intend for a public
official, who had solicited and encouraged a bribe with a false representation that the official act was in futuro, to escape liability for bribe-solicitation by proving that he had successfully hidden the truth of past performance from the bribe-payer.
Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
105See generally Note, Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law, 92
HARv. L. RE v. 451 (1978); Note, The Bribed Congressman'sImmunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bribed Congressman].
108See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); United
States v. Passman, 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
11 506 F.2d at 77 (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) and Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)).
'" See id. at 62; United States v. Passman, 460 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. La. 1978).
1' The Federal Election Campaign Act specifically states that each individual
who is a"candidate for federal office is required to set up a separate re-election cam-
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cent campaign contributions fall within the purview of the
gratuity subsections of the statute. Furthermore, as the Second Circuit stated in United States v. Brewster: "Congress
has an indisputable interest in proscribing [the conduct prohibited by the statute] as a means for preserving the integrity
of governmental operations. This interest supersedes any conceivable First Amendment value related to such conduct."1 1 0
III.

THE

FEDERAL BRIBERY STATUTE AND

THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE

A. Brewster and Helstoski: The Inadmissibility of
"Legislative Acts"
The federal bribery statute specifically applies to members of Congress,"" and several have been convicted under the

statute.1 12 A prime contention of those indicted has been that

their indictment violates the speech or debate clause of the
United States Constitution.1 1 3 The Supreme Court's decision
paign committee. The Act provides that the committee must keep a detailed account
of each contribution and furthermore, that "[a]ll funds of [the campaign] committee
shall be segregated from, and may not be commingled with, any personal funds of
officers, members, or associates of such committee." 2 U.S.C. § 432(b) (1976). If a
candidate is in compliance with this provision, there is no danger that a legitimate
campaign contribution could be deemed an illegal gratuity since such payment would
not be made to the candidate himself.
110

506 F.2d at 77.

18 U.S.C. § 201(a) defines "public official" to include "Members of Congress."
The first bribery statute applicable to Congressmen was enacted in 1853. Act of Feb.
26, 1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171.
See, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir. 1978); United
States v. Garmatz, 445 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1977); cf. United States v. Brewster, 506
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (former Congressman's conviction under the statute was reversed and remanded because of faulty jury instructions); United States v. Dowdy,
479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)(former Congressman convicted under the statute granted new trial because of constitutional violations).
11 The speech or debate clause provides: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either
House, they [Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. For a more detailed analysis of the speech or debate
clause see generally Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation
of Powers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege
of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past,Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1968); Bribed Congressman,
supra note 105.
1
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1 1 4 however, essentially elimiin United States v. Brewster,
nated this claim as a possible ground of contention. In that
case, a former United States Senator had been charged under
18 U.S.C. section 201 with accepting bribes and gratuities in
return for the performance of legislative acts. In holding that
Brewster's indictment did not violate the speech or debate
clause, the Court made it clear that proof of legislative acts is
not essential to a charge of bribery under subsection 201(c).
Thus, while the Court ruled that the government cannot introduce evidence of a legislative act 11 5 in a prosecution under
the bribery statute, the Court did hold that proof of legislative acts is not necessary to a conviction under the bribery
statute."'
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Brewster decision in United States v. Helstoski.1 17 After relying on Brewster for the proposition that evidence of or reference to a legislative act is inadmissible in the bribery prosecution of a
member of Congress, the Court reasoned that "[r]evealing information as to a legislative act-speaking or debating-to a
jury would subject a Member to being 'questioned' in a place
other than the House or Senate, thereby violating the explicit
prohibition of the Speech or Debate Clause.""" 8 However, the
Court proceeded to limit the scope of its holding by circumscribing the meaning of "legislative act." The Court observed
that: "it is clear from the language of the Clause that protection extends only to an act that has already been performed.
A promise to deliver a speech, to vote, or to solicit other votes
at some future date is not "speech or debate." Likewise, a
promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act."11 9 In light

114

"

408 U.S. 501 (1972).
In Brewster, the Supreme Court noted that a "legislative act has consistently

been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the business before
it." Id. at 512.
11 Id.
at 526. See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
117 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
18 Id. at 490.
"' Id.
(emphasis in original). In Helstoski the government made a rather unique
waiver argument. The prosecution proposed that, by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 201, Congress institutionally waived the speech or debate clause protection - that section 201
"represents a collective decision to enlist the aid of the Executive Branch and the
courts in the exercise of Congress' powers under Art. I, § 5, to discipline its mem-
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of the Brewster and Helstoski decisions the only determination necessary is whether the government has enough information to indict the member of Congress without inquiring
into legislative acts as that term is defined in Brewster and
Helstoski.
B. Should the FederalBribery Statute Apply to
Members of Congress?
Although Brewster and Helstoski clearly stand for the
proposition that the speech or debate clause does not prohibit
the prosecution of a member of Congress under the federal
bribery statute, the eventuality of future revision of the statute raises at least one important question: should members of
Congress be included under the statute at all? Indeed, some
commentators have suggested that the legislature is the
proper forum for the trial and punishment of its members.12 0
For several reasons, the courts appear to be a more appropriate forum for dealing with the bribery of Congressmen
than the legislature itself. First, the judiciary has the expertise
to ensure a fair trial, while in the legislature, political considerations could prevail. 121 Second, "[h]istory demonstrates that
when left to act upon their own initiative legislatures are un' The arlikely to pursue charges of corruption of members."122
bers." Id. at 492. Although the Court expressed doubt as to whether Congress could
constitutionally waive the protection of the clause for individual members, it held
that even assuming it could, "such a waiver could be shown only by an explicit and
unequivocal expression." Id. at 493. The Court held that there was no evidence of
waiver in the language or legislative history of the federal bribery statute. Id.
120See generally, Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of
Speech and Debate: Its Past,Present and Future as a Bar to CriminalProsecutions
in the Courts,2 SUFFOLK U. L. Rav. 1 (1968); Comment, Texas Public Ethics Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 Tax. L. Ray. 931 (1972).
'2
See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 519-20 & n.14 (1972); Cranston,
supra note 3, at 222 & n.38.
112Cranston, supra note 3, at 222 & n.39.
An officeholder is not likely to institute investigation against members of
his own party; investigation against opposing party members founders on
the political reality that the guns soon might be turned around. Even when
they abandon this "live and let live" philosophy and actually wield the disciplinary power, legislators are more likely to punish violations against "the
club" than violations against the public trust. Thus, misconduct that is
punished concerns "mostly matters of internal etiquette and regularity,"
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gument in favor of the legislature as a more appropriate place
for trial is based upon the fear of harassment by members of
the executive branch. 128 However, this contention is nothing
more than conjecture inasmuch as the prosecutions that have
been brought under the statute do not reflect this type of
abuse. 12 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly considered and
dismissed this argument in Brewster.12 The Court reasoned
that while a strategically timed indictment could possibly
harm a congressman's reelection chances, the barriers to any
vindictive indictment under the statute are significant and, in
addition, are counterbalanced by the fact that the legislative
branch has weapons of its own.'2 6 Therefore, prosecution via
the federal bribery statute of cases involving the bribery of
legislators offers clear advantages to the retention of that authority by the legislature itself.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion indicates that while the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. section 201 is not a panacea, it is
not unconstitutionally vague. The statute does provide sufficient notice of the conduct prohibited and has been susceptible to consistent interpretation by the courts. Indeed, any lack
of specificity on the face of the statute is a function of the
underlying congressional purpose to guarantee the integrity,
fairness and impartiality of public officials. Similarly, while
the statute is expansive, it is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Concern about potential abuse in the application of
the statute and "problems which may yet arise in the peripheral areas of the law's coverage"'12 7 should be abated by conseldom unethical conduct which has no institutional effects.
Comment, supra note 120, at 957 & n.79.
I'lCranston, supra note 3, at 223.
114See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 523-24 (1972). The Supreme
Court stated: "We are not cited to any cases in which the bribery statutes, which
have been applicable to Members of Congress for over 100 years, have been abused
by the Executive Branch." Id.
IId.

, United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 522, n.16 (1971); see also Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 113, at 1159.
"I United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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sideration of the manner in which the law actually has been
applied, and by a common sense realization of the limits of
this application. Finally, it is suggested that it is desirable to
apply the federal bribery statute to members of Congress and
that the enforcement of the statute against congressmen does
not contravene the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution.
The federal bribery statute is an effective weapon in the
battle against the most flagrant violation of public trust the bribery of a public official. Although it may be true that
the existing statute is not a "model of clarity and nicely
drawn distinctions,

'128

the statute serves its purposes well,

and any contemplated revision should be considered in light
of the efficacy of the present law. It is indeed axiomatic that
anemic, loophole-ridden statutes are ineffective, and in the
area of federal bribery law, where concern for the public interest is paramount, an ineffective statute would be disasterous.
Susan DaunhauerPhillips

"s

Id. at 78.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 68

1979-80

Number 4

EDITORIAL BOARD, 1979-80
Editor-in-Chief............................
Managing Editor ......................
Articles Editors ...........................

Comments Editor........................
Comments and Survey Editor .............
Notes Editor ................................
Research Editor ...........................

ELIZABETH

A.

NOYES

H.

OCKERMAN
NICHOLAS R. GLANCY
JAhmS F. ROBERTS
THOMAS L. SIA
O~iosm
MARK R. OVERSTREET
PHILIP W. COLLIER

JEFFERSON

MACK J. MORGAN

I

STAFF
MICHAEL

D. BAKER

WM. BARRY BIRDWHISTELL
JANE ELIZABETH BoNwuRAr
C. CRAIG BRADLEY, JR.

DAVID A. BRILL
PAUL BRENT CALICO
JEAN L. COLLIER
WAYNE FREDERICK COLLIER
STEVEN CONNELLY

RANDY DEDDENS
ANDREA K. DONOHO
BETH PEDERSON DouTT

KmnBRLY K. GREENE
DEBORAH ALFORD KNoX
JAMEs R. LYONS
TmoTHY L. MAULDIN
GEOFFREY R. MORGAN

ELIZABETH NICKELS
MARGARET CARLYLE PRICE
NANCY T. RAY

WIULAM F. RIGSBY
CATHERINE CUNDIF SEWELL
PmLLIP SHEPHERD
WILLIAM E. SPICER
CARL J. STICH, JR.
EARL FREDERICK STRAUB, JR.
JANET STUMBO
PENNY TRAVELSTED

DAVID E. ARVIN
DANNY J. BASIL
STEVEN F. BRINES

WINIFRED

L. BRYANT

ELIZABETH S. CASSIDY

MARSHA

A. Cox

STEVEN S. CRONE
TERRY E. FREESiAN
RONALD L. GREEN
GARY WAYNE HART
RICHARD

W.

HAY

DOUGLAS S. HYNDEN
JOHN T. LovErr
EILEEN M. MALONE

THOMAS C. MARKS
JANET MCCARTY
ELIZABETH A. MCCORD
MARSHALL A. MCMULLEN, JR.
ALBERT

B.

MCQUEEN, JR.

JOHN W. PHILLIPS
SUSAN D. PHILLIPS

JOHN P. RALL
JOHN R. RHORER, JR.
GEORGE E. ROEDER,

mH

REBECCA SCHUPBACH
DAVID WILLIAM SEEVIER

DANIEL ALLEN SIM1ONS
MICHAEL H. SIMas
ROXANE MARiE Tor.Asi
ANNE ABBOTT TRUMPF
RoY D. WASSON
MARY ANNE W-rrETR
REBECCA HANNER WHITE

RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, Faculty Advisor
FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW
ex officio
PATRICIA N. KINSELLA, Secretary

